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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of countries' choices of monetary policy framework 
(MPF). It uses a brief narrative focused on groupings of countries making similar choices to 
motivate an econometric analysis which also draws on previous work on the determinants of 
exchange rate regimes. That analysis brings in other more standard factors, as well as the trade 
networks of potential anchor currency blocs and the financial markets depth that are 
emphasised in the narrative. The model turns out to be able to predict three quarters of 
countries' choices of MPF, and there is no obvious systematic pattern in the errors. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a small but interesting literature on the determinants of countries' choices of exchange 
rate regime (notably Juhn and Mauro, 2002; Meissner and Oomes, 2009; Levy Yeyati, 
Sturzenegger and Reggio, 2010), but very little detailed work on countries' choices of monetary 
policy framework (MPF), where the latter includes both domestic (monetary targets, inflation 
targets and so on) as well as external (exchange rate) regimes. This paper sets out to remedy 
this lacuna. We provide a brief narrative overview of countries' evolving choices of MPF, 
which is followed by a detailed econometric analysis in which countries' choices depend on a 
range of standard factors as well as the trade networks of potential anchor currencies and the 
financial market depth emphasised in the narrative. We discuss our findings in some detail, and 
provide robustness tests. Our models are able to explain three quarters of countries' choices of 
MPF, and there is no obvious systematic pattern in the prediction errors: that suggests that 
changes in fashion such as the rise in popularity of inflation targeting are of limited importance.  
 
For policymakers interested in choosing a monetary policy framework there is also a long-
established normative literature on the pros and cons of fixed versus flexible exchange rates 
(e.g. Ghosh et al., 2002), and a smaller literature on, for example, the preconditions for adopting 
inflation targeting (e.g Batini and Laxton, 2007). Our positive analysis turns attention more to 
the factors that may have guided policymakers' past choices, which may also be helpful to 
policymakers involved in current choices. Our model brings together domestic and external 
considerations of MPF choices and factors overlooked in previous studies.  
 
 
2 Monetary policy frameworks and the trends over time in countries' choices 
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In this section we first briefly discuss the classification of MPFs in Cobham (2018) and then 
draw on the Individual Country Details available at www.monetaryframeworks.org to identify 
some features of the changes in the distribution of MPFs across countries over time. 
 
The classification covers both internal – e.g. money, inflation – and external, that is exchange 
rate, targets, together with the absence of formal targets under the heading of 'discretion'; and 
it considers the extent to which any targets are actually attained (de facto) as well as their (de 
jure) announcement. A framework is defined as a combination "of the objectives of the 
monetary authorities (including their understanding of the trade-offs between those objectives) 
and the set of constraints and conventions – the former more binding, the latter more matters 
of established usage – within which specific (conjunctural) monetary policy decisions are 
made" (Cobham, 2018, p5). Distinctions are made between 'loose' and 'full' targeting, between 
converging and stationary targets, between exchange rate 'fixing' and exchange rate 'targeting', 
between different types of currency board, and between 'unstructured', 'loosely structured' and 
'well structured' discretion. This all leads to a full 'menu' of 32 different frameworks, but these 
are then aggregated along two different dimensions, by target variable and by degree of 
monetary control, as set out in Table 1. The classification has been implemented over 1974-
2014 for 26 'advanced' countries plus the Euro Area, and 33 'emerging' economies, and the 
results can be found on the website. The main overall trends that come out are, first, that 
countries have moved over time away from monetary and to a lesser extent exchange rate 
targeting, and towards inflation targeting; second, that countries have moved over time towards 
frameworks that offer greater degrees of overall monetary control; and third, that these broad 
trends apply more strongly for advanced but are also present among emerging countries. 
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Table 1 Two aggregations of monetary policy frameworks 
by target variable: frameworks 
direct controls multiple direct controls (command economy) 
exchange rate fixing pure and augmented exchange rate fix, pure currency 
board 
exchange rate targeting augmented currency board; full and loose, stationary 
and converging, exchange rate targeting 
monetary targeting full and loose, stationary and converging, monetary 
targeting  
inflation targeting full and loose, stationary and converging, inflation 
targeting  
mixed targeting all combinations of monetary, exchange rate and 
inflation targeting 
unstructured discretion unstructured discretion 
loosely structured discretion loosely structured discretion 
well structured discretion well structured discretion 
no national framework membership of currency union, use of another 
sovereign's currency 
by degree of monetary 
control: 
 
rudimentary multiple direct controls, pure exchange rate fix 
intermediate augmented exchange rate fix, pure currency board, 
unstructured discretion 
substantial augmented currency board, all loose targeting, all 
converging targeting, all mixed targeting, loosely 
structured discretion 
intensive full exchange rate/monetary/inflation targeting, well 
structured discretion 
For further details and precise definitions see tables 1-4 of Cobham (2018) and 
www.monetaryframeworks.org.  
 
In what follows we focus on individual countries' choices. We do not present a full narrative, 
because that would require the use of a wide range of sources for each individual country. But 
we can use the Individual Country Details available on the website (derived primarily from 
close reading of successive IMF Article IV consultation reports and related materials) to 
identify common patterns for different groups of countries, in order to shed some light on the 
determinants of countries' choices which we can use in the following section in the econometric 
analysis, when we bring in a range of additional determinants. Here we consider the advanced 
countries first, and then the emerging economies. We emphasise the development of financial 
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infrastructure and markets, as well as the actual choices of MPFs, since these are covered in 
the individual country details.  
 
For the narrative that follows, one of the most obvious determinants of MPF choices is country 
size, which we categorise as follows: we find the ratio for each country of its GDP and of its 
population to the total GDP/population of the 59 countries covered, and then take the average 
of those two ratios for each country.1 On that basis we identify as 'large' (average ratio >5%) 
the US, the Euro Area, Japan, China and India; as 'medium' (average > 2%) France, Germany, 
Italy, the UK, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia; as 'small' (average > 1%) Spain, Australia, 
Canada, Pakistan, South Korea and Turkey; and all the other countries in the sample as 'very 
small'. See Table A1 in the Appendix (which shows what countries are classified as advanced 
and which as emerging, and  indicates when a country moves between different categories over 
time). 
 
A second important determinant is the extent to which countries' trade is concentrated on the 
currency bloc constituted by a potential anchor country together with the other countries that 
peg to that anchor. Drawing upon Meissner and Oomes (2009), we define a country's 'anchor 
network' as the ratio to its GDP of its trade with its highest potential anchor currency bloc (see 
section 3 for further details). Table A2 in the Appendix shows the magnitude of this anchor 
network variable and the currency concerned for selected years through the sample. For 
example, Austria's trade is concentrated initially on the DM and later on the Euro, while 
Greece's trade with these (or other) potential anchors is much lower throughout. We now 
consider various groupings of countries and their monetary policy frameworks. 
 
1
 
1
 If we were considering only advanced countries, which all have relatively similar GDP per capita, it would 
not be necessary to consider population as well, but when our sample includes the US and China and India, the 
average of the GDP and population ratios provides a more useful measure of size. 
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Among the advanced countries there are a number which have used exchange rate targets for 
long periods, all very small countries: Austria, Belgium (plus Luxembourg), Ireland, 
Netherlands and (initially less firmly) Portugal which fixed their exchange rates within the 
European Monetary System from the 1980s to the start of European Monetary Union (EMU) 
in 1999; Denmark, which still fixes its exchange rate to the euro; and Hong Kong which has 
operated a currency board on the US dollar since 1984. In all these cases it seems likely that 
the vulnerability to swings in financial markets implied by their size led them to favour a hard 
exchange rate peg to a solid anchor, and most of them had a high concentration of trade with 
one particular currency bloc. They also experienced improvements over time in financial 
infrastructure, financial markets and capital openness which would have made them more 
exposed to financial volatility but also improved the tools available to control their 
vulnerability. 
 
A second group of advanced countries each tried a variety of different frameworks before 
settling on inflation targeting: one medium-sized country, the UK; small countries including 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea and Spain (pre-EMU); and very small countries 
including Finland (pre-EMU), Norway and Sweden, but also Switzerland (whose 'loose' 
inflation targeting has been accompanied by some exchange rate targeting in recent years), and 
also Singapore (whose inflation targeting is implemented through controlled exchange rate 
variations). In the small and medium countries, exchange rate targeting under Bretton Woods 
and for a few years after was replaced by monetary targeting, but without success, followed by 
periods of discretion, before the adoption of inflation targeting; it seems likely that these 
countries felt, after the evident failure of earlier frameworks, that they needed the detailed 
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'intensive' control offered by IT.2 The very small countries tried exchange rate targeting for 
longer and moved directly or via shorter periods of discretion to inflation targeting. Relative to 
the very small countries that pegged their currencies within the EMS, it seems likely that these 
countries may have found exchange rate targeting less satisfactory because their trade was less 
concentrated on any single potential anchor currency, see Table A2. While the UK started from 
a position of greater financial development than the others, all these countries experienced 
improvements in their financial arrangements over the period, which made them more exposed 
to financial volatility but also helped to make IT viable.3 
A third group consists of medium-sized countries which used a variety of frameworks including 
mixed targets in the period before EMU: France, Germany and Italy. It seems likely that these 
countries were large enough for their trade to be diversified in ways that made pure exchange 
rate targeting unsuitable, but not large enough to be protected from the effects of swings in 
financial markets, so that they felt the need to explicitly target more than one variable, 
particularly in the run-up to EMU where the Maastricht Treaty set out multiple criteria for 
admission. They each tried monetary targets, with varying degrees of success, but over time 
their exchange rate targets became more important. Financial developments played their usual 
role.  
 
Fourthly, we can identify three large countries/currency areas which used either loosely 
structured discretion or loose inflation targeting over long periods: the USA, the Euro Area 
(from 1999) and Japan. These are countries/areas whose size meant that there was no feasible 
exchange rate anchor, but for the same reason they were less vulnerable to swings in financial 
 
2
 The UK is bigger than the other countries here, but it has also been more open to financial volatility, 
particularly exchange rate swings, because of the size of its financial sector. 
3
 The development of bond markets enables monetary policy to be isolated from fiscal policy, while the 
development of interbank money markets is necessary for the central bank's policy interest rate to be transmitted 
effectively through to the banks' customers and the wider economy. See, for example, Alexander et al. (1995), 
Laurens et al. (2005). 
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markets. The first two, and the third in the later part of the period, also had highly sophisticated 
financial markets and infrastructure which offered greater monetary control. Those two factors 
may have meant that they felt less need for the intensive monetary control offered by full 
inflation targeting. 
 
Among the emerging economies, we can identify a first group of countries which have used 
exchange rate fixing and exchange rate targeting on a continuing basis: Jordan and Morocco; 
Egypt in the 1990s; Argentina in the 1990s (in the form of a currency board); and Malaysia and 
Venezuela in the early part of the period. All of these were very small countries with relatively 
underdeveloped financial systems, for which a hard peg offered more stability than any other 
arrangement, even though in most cases their trade was less concentrated on their anchor 
currencies than it was for the very small countries pegging within the EMS (Table A2). 
 
A second group of countries used exchange rate fixing and targeting on the way to joining 
EMU: Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia; and Bulgaria (in the form of a 
currency board) which has not yet been admitted to EMU. These countries were small, with 
limited financial markets and vulnerable to financial volatility, they needed to stabilise their 
exchange rates and their inflation rates in order to be allowed to enter EMU under the 
Maastricht criteria, and hard pegs offered some obvious stability. Slovakia, on the other hand, 
used exchange rate targets but in conjunction with inflation targets in the crucial qualification 
period, and Greece (the only advanced country not mentioned above, a country which was less 
open and less integrated in its trade with the rest of the EU, and also less financially developed) 
used exchange rate and monetary targets in the same way.  
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A third group have favoured loosely structured discretion over targets: the large countries 
China and India; medium-sized Russia, and Brazil up to 1998; small Pakistan; and very small 
Malaysia 1985-97, Argentina post-2001, Croatia, and Venezuela up to 2009. For the first two 
of these, large size and initially less openness would mean less vulnerability to financial swings 
so less pressure to commit to a single clear-cut target, while less concentration of trade on a 
single potential anchor would have made exchange rate fixing less attractive; 4  similar 
considerations would have been relevant to some extent for Russia and Brazil. Malaysia had 
relatively well-developed financial infrastructure and markets by this time, and that may have 
enabled it also to avoid committing to a single target, but this is less true of Argentina, Croatia, 
and Venezuela. However, for these four countries discretion may have been more the result of 
a push from the failure or unattractiveness of other options rather than the positive pull of 
discretion itself. Pakistan, on the other hand, had much less well-developed financial 
arrangements, with elements of direct control that may have facilitated the absence of targets, 
particularly in the earlier years. 
 
A fourth group includes countries which tried a variety of different frameworks, typically some 
exchange rate targeting and for lengthy periods loosely structured discretion, before homing in 
on inflation targeting: medium-sized Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico; small Turkey; and very 
small Chile, Czechia, Hungary, Israel, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa and 
Thailand. It seems plausible that intensive monetary control through IT must have offered these 
countries significant improvements over the looser control in their discretion periods. 
 
 
4
 However, China managed its exchange rate heavily with reference to the USD between the mid-1990s and the 
mid-2000s. 
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Finally, Venezuela from 2010 to 2014 is an example of a country where monetary policy was 
increasingly undisciplined, with strong fiscal dominance and growing use of direct controls. 
The (tentative) identification of its framework as unstructured discretion seems above all to 
reflect the politics of the country rather than economic factors.  
 
This brief 'narrative' discussion has highlighted size, financial development, and the 
concentration of countries' trade on potential anchor blocs as crucial determinants of countries' 
choices of MPFs. We include them, with a range of other factors, in our econometric analysis 
below. 
 
3 Model  
We aim to study the determinants of countries’ MPF in the post-Bretton Woods period (1983 
to 2014). We want to estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is country 𝑖’s choice of MPF at time 𝑡. Given the discrete nature of countries’ MPFs, 
equation (1) cannot be estimated directly. From the random utility model, the choice of 
countries’ MPF y reflects the unobservable utility 𝑦∗ associated with the choice. We adopt the 
multinomial logit model (MNL) for estimation. With the MNL model, it is assumed that the 
log-odds of each MPF choice follow a linear model  𝑦𝑖𝑡∗ = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡𝜋0𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑗 (2)  
where 𝑖  denotes country, 𝑡  denotes time, 𝑥  are potential determinants, 𝛽  are coefficients 
associated with those determinants and 𝑦 are MPF choices.  Subscript 𝑗 denotes alternative 
MPF choices. One of the MPF choices is the default category with 𝑗 = 0. 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡 is the conditional 
probability of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 to choose alternative j and 𝜋0𝑖𝑡 is country 𝑖's probability of 
choosing the default category at time 𝑡.  Thus  
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𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡 =  exp(𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽𝑗)∑ exp (𝐽𝑘=1 𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽𝑘) + 1 (3) 
Let 𝑁  be the total number of observations. The corresponding log likelihood function for 
maximum likelihood estimation is  
log(𝐿) =  ∑ ∑ exp(𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽𝑗)∑ exp (𝐽𝑘=1 𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽𝑘) + 1 𝐽𝑗=0𝑁𝑖𝑡=1 (4) 
The MNL model finds coefficients that maximise the log likelihood. However, coefficients 
here do not directly reflect how variables change the marginal probability of adopting a certain 
regime. To obtain the marginal effects of the MNL model, we need predictions from a fitted 
model at fixed values of some covariates and integrating over the remaining covariates. The 
marginal effects of the explanatory variable 𝑙 for the 𝑗-th alternative can be calculated from 
equation (5). 𝑑𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡 (𝛽𝑗𝑙 − ∑ 𝜋𝑞𝑗𝑡𝛽𝑞𝑗𝑞 ) (5) 
where 𝑞 represents all the explanatory variables for 𝑙. The conventional method for showing 
the economic significance of the independent variables is to estimate the marginal effects for 
each observation and report the average or sum of the marginal effects. Following Levy Yeyati 
et al. (2010), we plot predictive margins at different values of explanatory variables instead of 
averaging or summing them. This plot of predictive margin method provides a clearer 
illustration of the economic significance of the explanatory variables. The point estimation of 
the coefficients tells how a variable influences the choice of one option over the default option, 
while the predictive margins show how a variable affects countries’ probability to do a 
particular MPF.  
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The random utility framework implies the model has a unique solution. If two countries share 
similar characteristics in terms of determinants, they should choose the same MPF. Hence for 
prediction failures, we look for reasons beyond the model. The model does not imply or expect 
a stable solution. When the determinants evolve, the choice of MPF could change. With panel 
data, we exploit variations across both countries and years. We include year dummies to allow 
for different intercepts for each year.  
 
3 Determinants and data sources  
We use the potential determinants highlighted in section 2 with a range of other, more standard, 
variables, drawing on the work of Juhn and Mauro (2002), Meissner and Oomes (2009), Levy 
Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2010) and Song (2018), on the determinants of exchange 
rate regime choices, and papers by Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008a, 2008b; also Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2010), which analyse separately the choices of monetary targets, exchange rate targets 
and inflation targets.5 The exchange rate regime literature has used variables such as trade 
openness, size, terms of trade shocks, capital openness, financial development, past inflation, 
central bank independence, political instability, governance, and GDP per capita, together with 
foreign liabilities (Levy Yeyati et al., 2010) and cross-country correlations between output and 
inflation (Juhn and Mauro, 2002; Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008b).6 Song (2018) also 
allows for network effects. The work by Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel on monetary and 
inflation targets has used broadly similar variables, together with monetary instability for MTs 
and the exchange rate regime for ITs.  
 
 
5
 There is an apparently unpublished paper by Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel on inflation targets, whose main 
results are reported in Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
6
 It is worth noting that this literature has not so far produced a strong consensus: earlier work reviewed and 
extended by Juhn and Mauro (2002) found size to be important, but no consistent results for other variables, 
while Levy Yeyati et al (2010) found support for a wide range of variables as determinants of exchange rate 
regimes.  
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 We draw on these variables, together with an anchor network variable which builds upon the 
work of Meissner and Oomes (2009). We now discuss in turn the particular explanatory 
variables that we use, starting with our investigation of the determinants of target variables. 
Precise descriptions and sources are presented in table 2. 
 
Policymakers take into account past economic conditions in addition to the current situation 
when setting monetary policies. Thus we use the average value of the preceding three years for 
most explanatory variables. This also helps to deal with concerns about reverse causality. For 
example, the commitment to adopt ITs might lead to higher trade openness even before the 
adoption is implemented. However, the adoption of ITs would not usually be announced three 
years in advance. Hence if we observe an association between high trade openness and IT 
MPFs, it should not be caused by reverse causality. Determinants such as economic size, trade 
openness, whether the country is a fuel exporter and whether the country is an emerging 
economy can be directly calculated or identified. We adopt index measures from Chinn & Ito 
(2008), Svirydzenka (2016), Garriga (2016) and Jaggers & Marshall (2009) to examine the 
impacts of capital account openness, financial market development, central bank independence 
and political institutions respectively. Svirydzenka (2016) provides a new index for financial 
development which measures depth, access and efficiency of financial institutions and markets. 
Financial market depth is more relevant here, because of the crucial role of bond markets in 
monetary policy. 7  Hence we use financial market depth as the measure of financial 
development instead of Svirydzenka's combined final score.   
 
 
7
 Svirydzenka does not consider the development of money markets, but bond and money markets often but not 
always develop more or less in tandem. 
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We include historical peak inflation as an indicator of past experience which may affect MPF 
choice. Historical peak inflation is measured as the average of the three peak years of inflation 
in the MPFs covering the 20 years before the current MPF. For example, if a country does not 
change MPF for a few years, historical inflation would be the same for the country during these 
years (unless the peak had occurred right at the start of the 20 years). Moreover, we use two 
dummies, one for if a country has an historical peak inflation higher than 10% and the other 
for if its peak is higher than 20%. For advanced economies, an inflation rate higher than 10% 
has generally been considered serious and so might cause central banks to rethink their 
monetary policy arrangements. However, for many emerging economies, an inflation rate of 
double digits has in the past often been acceptable, but most governments and/or central banks 
would have been concerned about an inflation rate higher than 20%.   
 
The measure of currency network effects is more complicated. We define the currency network 
for a specific anchor as 𝐴𝑘,𝑖: 
𝐴𝑘,𝑖 =  ∑ ((𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡) ×  𝐷(𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝑘) 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 )𝑗  
Where 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  is import from country 𝑖  to country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 , 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  is export from 
country 𝑖 to country 𝑗 at time 𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑗𝑡 is the anchor currency of country 𝑗 at time 𝑡. Note 
that a country has an anchor currency only if it is a hard or soft peg country as defined in 
Shambaugh's Exchange Rate Regime Classification.8 There is a set of major anchor currencies 
including the US dollar, French franc, Deutsche mark, British pound.  𝐷(𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝑘) is a 
dummy variable, equal to one if country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 adopted the anchor currency 𝑘. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is 
the GDP of country 𝑖  at time 𝑡 . Overall 𝐴𝑘,𝑖  measures country 𝑖 ’s trade volume with all 
 
8
 See Klein and Shambaugh (2008, 2010) for construction of the Shambaugh exchange rate regime 
classification.  The dataset can be found at https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/about/faculty/jshambaugh/data.cfm.  
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countries pegging to the anchor currency 𝑘 as a share of country 𝑖’s GDP. 𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 
is the largest such ratio for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡:  𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 = max (𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟,𝑖,  𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐,𝑖,  𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑖,  𝐴𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖) 
Meissner and Oomes (2009), in their study of countries' choices of anchors, measure network 
externalities for a country as trade flows with countries pegging to the same anchor as a 
percentage of GDP. This is similar to our measurement of anchor network effects, but we use 
the largest ratio of trade with an anchor bloc as a percentage of GDP. We can interpret the 
currency network as indicating the potential gains from fixing exchange rates. In this way, 
countries doing floats or managed floats are also potentially influenced by anchor networks.   
 
We now turn to the aggregation of MPFs by degree of monetary control. There is a general 
presumption that emerging and developing countries have a number of features that complicate 
or restrict the choice of monetary policy regime (Mishkin, 2004; Frankel, 2010), which might 
imply that these countries opt for arrangements with lower monetary control. However, there 
are few papers that address the possible determinants of the choice of the degree of monetary 
control. In an attempt to bring the arguments together, Cobham (2011) discussed the stage of 
development of financial markets and institutions (including the central bank), and identified 
three polar types of 'monetary architecture' – basic, intermediate and modern – which he 
associated in turn with different possible monetary policy arrangements. In particular, he 
argued that only when the transmission channel of monetary policy – the institutional and 
market infrastructure – is well developed are central banks able to conduct policies mainly 
through interest rates and operate frameworks like inflation targeting.  Given the division here 
into four degrees of monetary control – rudimentary, intermediate, substantial and intensive – 
we would expect full development of financial markets and institutions to be associated with 
intensive or (particularly for larger, less financially exposed, economies) substantial 
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frameworks, partial development with intermediate or substantial  frameworks, and limited 
development with exchange rate fixing (which is included in the rudimentary category of MPFs 
while exchange rate targeting is in the intensive category). We also include in these regressions 
the variables used in examining the choice of target variable.  
 
In the main regressions, we treat the Euro Area as a single unit and the ECB as its central bank. 
Hence for most explanatory variables of the Euro Area, we use the average value of Euro Area 
member countries in the sample. The log of the sum of the GDP of Euro Area member countries 
in the sample is used to measure the economic size of the Euro Area. For trade openness and 
anchor network, we measure the trade of Euro Area countries with non-Euro Area countries. 
Thus, intra-Euro Area member trade flows are not counted toward trade openness and anchor 
networks. An alternative treatment of the Euro Area will be discussed in the robustness tests.  
Table 2 Data description and sources 
Variable name Measure Calculation Source 
l_economy Economic size 12 ( 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙) > 5% WDI series 
m_economy Economic size 5% ≥ 12 ( 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙) > 2%  
s_economy Economic size 
(Default category) 2% ≥ ( 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙) > 1%  
vs_economy Economic size ( 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙) ≤ 1%  
tradeopen_avg Trade openness (import+export)/GDP WDI series 
anchor_network_gdp Strength of anchor 
network 
Largest ratio of country’ trade with each of 
the main anchor blocs  
Direction of 
Trade(IMF), CEPII 
totstd_avg Real shocks Standard deviation of the logarithm of terms 
of trade 
WDI series 
fuel_exporter Fuel exporter Dummy variable = 1 for countries with fuel 
exports equal to more than 20% of their total 
merchandise exports 
WDI series 
inf_avg_d10 Past inflation  Dummy variable = 1 for countries with 
historical peak inflation higher than 10%.  
WDI series, IFS 
inf_avg_d20 Past inflation  Dummy variable = 1 for countries with 
historical peak inflation higher than 20%.  
 
lsav_avg Domestic saving Log of domestic saving WDI series 
fmd_avg Financial market 
depth  
Index measure Svirydzenka (2016) 
caopen_avg Capital account 
openness 
Index measure Chinn & Ito (2008)  
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cbi_weighted_avg9 Central bank 
independence 
Index measure Garriga (2016)  
 
polity_avg10 Political institution Index measure Jaggers & Marshall 
(2009)  
emerging Emerging 
economy 
Dummy variable for emerging economies Cobham (2018) 
MPF Monetary policy 
framework 
 
Cobham (2018) 
 
4 Results  
There are 32 categories in Cobham (2018)’s monetary policy framework classification. We use 
each of the two aggregations of MPFs set out in section 2, by target variable and by degree of 
monetary control, in order to have a reasonable number of choices for the dependent variable. 
All regressions are done with the MNL model, a constant and year dummies.  
 
4.1 Aggregation by target variable 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the coefficients. Here the default category is exchange rate 
targets, and we focus on discretion, mixed targets and inflation targets. The parameters of most 
variables are statistically significant. The magnitudes of coefficients in the MNL model are 
hard to interpret, but we use predictive margin plots to assess the economic significance of the 
variables.  
 
 
9
 The central bank independence index does not cover Hong Kong for the whole sample period or Cyprus before 
2002. For Cyprus Garriga has LVAW = 0.575 from 2002 onwards, but nothing before that. It is clear that there 
was a major change in Cyprus's CBI in 2002. We give Cyprus a score of 0.25 for the years before 2002 - this is 
about the score for each of the UK (former colonial power of Cyprus), France and Italy in the 1980s/early 
1990s. For Hong Kong, the IMF report on Financial Sector Assessment Program - Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision - Detailed assessment of observance, July 2014, says "The HKMA enjoys 
operational de facto independence but this is not underpinned by the law." (p. 32). As with Cyprus, this is an 
example of high 'informal' independence but low legal independence, and for Garriga's index it's the latter that 
counts. We give the HK Monetary Authority also a score of 0.25, which is close, for example, to the score of the 
UK BoE before 1998 when it exactly had operational independence but nothing more. 
10
 The Polity IV scores do not cover economies with a total population less than 500,000 in the most recent year. 
We assign values to Hong Kong, Iceland and Malta in order to keep them in the sample. The Polity IV score is 
assigned based on political similarity with other countries in the sample.  The assigned scores for Hong Kong, 
Iceland and Malta are -6, 10 and 8 correspondingly. Scores of -66, -77 and -88 are three special values for 
'anocracies' in particular circumstances and do not reflect political situations on the basic scale. Hence we use -
15 instead of the three special values to keep scores comparable.  
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Table 3 Results – Aggregation by target variable 
  D Mixed IT 
very small economy -3.292*** -4.863*** -3.913*** 
 (0.667) (0.850) (0.701) 
medium economy -1.516* 0.324 -1.626* 
 
(0.769) (0.892) (0.807) 
large economy 15.74 14.18 13.46 
 (962.1) (962.1) (962.1) 
trade openness 0.660* 1.867 2.646*** 
 
(0.295) (1.149) (0.343) 
anchor network / GDP -9.076*** -1.274 -14.09*** 
 
(1.185) (2.270) (1.288) 
past inflation 10% 0.498 -1.295* -1.205*** 
 
(0.435) (0.507) (0.356) 
past inflation 20% 1.195*** 1.567*** 1.408*** 
 
(0.241) (0.465) (0.326) 
financial markets depth 4.941*** 1.099 5.585*** 
 
(0.710) (1.351) (0.744) 
capital account openness -0.423*** -0.774*** 0.139 
 
(0.0792) (0.185) (0.0936) 
central bank independence 0.430 1.791 -0.105 
 
(0.622) (1.108) (0.684) 
polity -0.00817 0.848*** 0.232*** 
 
(0.0188) (0.203) (0.0378) 
emerging 1.685*** -1.382* 0.842* 
 
(0.286) (0.596) (0.355) 
fuel exporter 0.990*** -16.22 -0.609 
 
(0.243) (671.6) (0.336) 
N 
  
1442 
pseudo R2 
  
0.504 
Log likelihood     -791.0 
The default category is ERT. *, ** and *** represents significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors in the brackets. The MT category is dropped automatically because of data availability and sample period.  
 
The parameters of being a very small economy are all significant and negative, suggesting that 
relative to the default category of small economy, very small countries are less likely to do 
non-ERT MPFs. However, it is possible for a determinant to have a small and significant 
impact on the likelihood of countries’ MPF choices. The predictive margins can tell us the 
magnitude and economic significance of the impacts for each variable. Figure 1 shows the 
predictive margins of the model. Taking the first graph as an example, the predictive margin 
shows that, keeping other variables constant at their mean values for continuous variables and 
zeros for dummy variables, for all countries with a being very small economy value equal to a 
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particular point (on the x-axis) the proportion of countries to choose ERT (or Mixed, D or IT, 
depending on the line) would be equal to the corresponding value on the y-axis. And the sum 
of the probabilities of choosing a certain MPF given the particular value of the determinant is 
always equal to 1. Since being a very small economy is a dummy variable, only the endpoints 
on the line (0 and 1) are meaningful. The plots suggest that, keeping other determinants 
constant at their mean values, being a very small economy will increase countries’ probability 
to do ERT MPFs from 5% to 35%, decrease countries’ probability to do Mixed MPFs from 25% 
to nearly 0% and have little impacts on countries’ likelihood to do D or IT MPFs.  
 
The coefficients on being a medium economy are negative and significant for D and IT, and 
insignificantly positive for Mixed: medium countries are more likely to do ERT rather than D 
or IT. Being a medium economy increases a countries’ probability to do ERT by 20%. 
 
The coefficients on being a large economy are all positive but insignificant. Large economies 
are less likely to do ERT but these results are insignificant. From the predictive margins, 
compared to the default category (small economy), large economies are 40% more likely to do 
D and 20% less likely to do ERT.  In summary, large economies are more likely to do D and 
other economies are more likely to do ERT. Moreover, a very small economy is more likely to 
do ERT than a small economy.  
 
Note that the coefficients on being a large economy are positive and insignificant, but the 
predictive margin of being a large economy on IT is negative. This is not common but it is 
normal. The raw coefficients in an MNL model refer to changes in the log of the probability of 
one outcome divided by the probability of the baseline outcome (conditional probability) 
keeping other variables constant, while the marginal effects refer to changes in the probability 
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of one outcome (unconditional probability) keeping other variables at the mean or default 
values. Hence it is important to read the results on the basis of both coefficient estimates and 
predictive margins. 
 
Trade patterns are important determinants of countries’ choice of target variable. Countries 
with a high level of trade openness are significantly more likely to do non-ERT MPFs, and 
countries with high anchor networks are unlikely to do non-ERT MPFs, though the coefficients 
on anchor network are only significant for D and IT. This fits the expectation that countries 
with high trade openness are more likely to want to use exchange rate flexibility as a tool to 
manage risk, while high anchor network effects increase countries’ probability of fixing their 
exchange rates and joining the anchor network. From the predictive margins, the effects are 
strong.  
 
A high historical peak inflation decreases countries’ likelihood to do Mixed and IT MPFs, 
while a very high historical peak inflation is associated with all non-ERT MPFs. This suggests 
that when historical inflation is moderately high, countries may adopt ERT to anchor inflation 
expectations. But when historical inflation is very high, a more 'domestic-focused' framework 
would be preferred.  
 
The coefficients of financial markets depth are significant and positive for D and IT, and 
insignificant and positive for Mixed. These results are broadly consistent with expectations, 
given that D (also Mixed) and IT are substantial and intensive MPFs respectively.  
 
The coefficients on capital account openness are negative and significant for D and Mixed, and 
positive and insignificant for IT: economies with a high level of capital account openness are 
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less likely to do D and Mixed. This is consistent with the idea of the impossible trinity. 
Countries cannot have fixed or managed exchange rates, monetary autonomy and free capital 
flow at the same time. However, the economic significance of this variable is limited seeing 
the predictive margins are flat.  
 
Central bank independence is not a significant determinant of countries’ target variable. As 
with the previous factor, the coefficients are insignificant and the predictive margins are flat.  
 
The coefficients on the Polity index are positive and significant for Mixed and IT. This is 
consistent with the idea that good political institutions could be initial conditions for doing 
credible Mixed and IT MPFs. It also meets the expectation of the 'policy crutch' theory that 
weak governments are likely to use ERTs to improve their credibility. From the predictive 
margins, the impacts of political conditions are significant as well.  
 
Being an emerging economy is a significant determinant of target variable choice. Emerging 
economies are more likely to do D and IT and less likely to do Mixed relative to ERT. From 
the figure, emerging economies are 20% more likely to do D, 18% less likely to do Mixed and 
5% less likely to do ERT. This could be regarded as consistent with the bi-polar hypothesis, 
since in mixed targeting regimes, countries are mostly targeting the exchange rate as well as 
other variable(s). The results show that emerging economies do not favour ERTs or mixed 
MPFs which usually involve a managed float.  
 
Fuel exporter countries are more likely to do D rather than ERT. The coefficients are 
insignificant on other choices. Being a fuel exporter will increase a countries’ likelihood to do 
D by 20%.  
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Figure 1 Predictive margins – Aggregation by target variable 
 
Overall, large economies and economies with good financial infrastructure and low trade 
openness are more likely to do D. Countries with a high level of trade openness and good 
political institutions are more likely to do IT. Mixed MPFs are preferred by countries with high 
trade openness, high network effects, low level of financial development, good political 
institutions and advanced economies. ERT is preferred by very small to medium economies, 
and countries with low trade openness but high network effects and low financial market depth.  
 
4.2 Aggregation by degree of monetary control 
For the aggregation of MPFs by degree of monetary control, we treat intermediate ('inter') as 
the default category and focus on the probability of substantial ('subst') or intensive ('intens') 
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monetary control MPFs. Estimates of the coefficients are presented in table 4 and predictive 
margins are shown in figure 2.11  
 
Table 4 Results – Aggregation by degree of monetary control 
  substantial intensive 
very small economy -1.563** -1.774** 
 (0.604) (0.647) 
medium economy 0.171 -2.144** 
 (0.745) (0.830) 
large economy -0.238 -3.666*** 
 (0.910) (0.978) 
trade openness -0.702 -1.641 
 (1.001) (1.018) 
anchor network / GDP -1.831 -0.906 
 (2.864) (2.911) 
past inflation 10% 3.189*** 2.842*** 
 (0.762) (0.777) 
past inflation 20% -0.208 -2.775*** 
 (0.453) (0.506) 
financial markets depth 19.76*** 18.21*** 
 (3.213) (3.248) 
capital account openness 1.355*** 1.589*** 
 (0.243) (0.251) 
central bank independence -1.371 -0.743 
 (1.261) (1.339) 
polity -0.0984*** -0.00425 
 (0.0295) (0.0352) 
emerging -1.759*** -3.096*** 
 (0.491) (0.541) 
fuel exporter -1.216** -2.196*** 
 (0.381) (0.454) 
N 
 
1471 
pseudo R2 
 
0.423 
Log likelihood   -727.6 
The default category is intermediate. *, ** and *** represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Standard errors in brackets. The rudimentary category is dropped automatically because of data availability and 
sample period.  
 
The coefficients on being a very small economy are significant and negative. Countries are 
unlikely to do subst or intens MPFs if they are in the very small category. From the predictive 
 
11
 We do not use terms of trade shocks or aggregate savings in the main regressions, for data availability 
reasons, but they are discussed under robustness tests below. 
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margins shown in figure 2, countries are slightly more likely to do inter MPFs and less likely 
to do other MPFs if they are very small economies.  
 
The results for being a medium economy are close to those for being a large economy. The 
coefficients on being a medium economy are negative and significant on intens, but positive 
and insignificant for subst. From the predictive margins, being a medium economy will 
significantly increase countries’ probability to do subst MPFs, notably decrease countries’ 
probability to do intens MPFs, and have little impact on countries’ likelihood to do inter MPFs. 
 
The coefficients on being a large economy on subst and intens are negative, but only significant 
on intens. The results suggest that, relative to the default category of small economy, large 
economies are likely to do MPFs with an intermediate level of control. The predictive margins 
show that the magnitudes of the impacts of being a large economy are similar to being a 
medium economy.  
 
Overall, economic size is an important determinant of countries’ MPF choices. When 
interpreting the results of economic size, it is important to note that the default category is being 
a small economy. Relative to being a small or very small economy, large or medium countries 
are likely to do subst and unlikely to do intens MPFs. Countries’ likelihood to do inter MPFs 
is not significantly influenced by economic size.   
 
From the coefficient estimates, countries with higher levels of trade openness and anchor 
network are more likely to do inter MPFs than subst and intens, but these results are statistically 
insignificant. The predictive margins suggest that with increases in trade openness, countries 
are more likely to do subst and less likely to do intens MPFs. With increases in strength of the 
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anchor network, countries are less likely to do subst and more likely to do inter and intens 
MPFs.  
 
A historical peak inflation higher than 10% would significantly increase countries’ likelihood 
to do an MPF with a higher degree of monetary control (subst and intens). However, when 
historical peak inflation is higher than 20%, countries’ likelihood to do intens MPF is 
significantly lower. From figure 2, countries with high historical peak inflation (more than 10%) 
are likely to do subst and intens and unlikely to do inter MPFs. Countries with very high 
historical peak inflation (more than 20%) are more likely to do inter and subst and unlikely to 
do intens MPFs.  
 
The coefficients on financial market depth on subst and intens are positive and significant. 
Countries with a higher degree of financial market depth are more likely to do subst and intens 
rather than inter MPFs. From the figure, with increases of the financial market depth index 
from 0 to 1, countries’ probability of doing inter MPFs decreases from 20% to 0%, while that 
of subst increases from 45% to 80% and that of intens decrease from 35% to 20%.  
 
The coefficients on capital account openness are positive and significant. Countries with a high 
level of capital account openness are more likely to do subst and intens MPFs. But the 
predictive margins of capital account openness are flat, suggesting that the economic 
significance of capital account openness is limited.  Central bank independence appears to be 
an insignificant determinant of countries’ MPF choices. The coefficients are insignificant and 
the predictive margins are flat.  
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The coefficients on the Polity IV scores are negative on subst and intens, but only significant 
on subst. From the predictive margins, countries with good political institutions are less likely 
to do subst and more likely to do intens and inter MPFs.  
 
Being an emerging economy and a fuel exporter are statistically significant determinants of 
MPF choices. Emerging economies and fuel exporters are more likely to do MPFs with an 
intermediate level of monetary control. Keeping other variables constant at their mean or 
default values, being an emerging economy increases countries’ likelihood to do inter and subst 
by 10% and decreases countries’ likelihood to do intens by 20%, and being a fuel exporter has 
similar impacts.   
 
Combining the results from point estimates of coefficients and predictive margins, economic 
size, historical peak inflation, financial development, political institutions and being an 
emerging economy are major determinants of countries’ choices of MPFs and degree of 
monetary control. Overall, small economies, very small and countries with low financial 
market depth are likely to do intens MPFs. Medium and large economies, countries with very 
high historical peak inflation and a high level of financial market depth, and which are 
emerging economies or fuel exporters, are likely to do subst MPFs.  
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Figure 2 Predictive margins – Aggregation by degree of monetary control 
 
5 Discussion   
In figures 3 and 4 we show the trends of chosen and predicted MPFs for each aggregation. The 
solid lines show the number of countries choosing a particular MPF in a given year and the 
dashed lines show the numbers predicted. The number of countries choosing IT and intens 
MPFs grows steadily over the period.  
 
The solid and dashed lines for each MPF are generally close and support the validity of the 
model. In the 2000s, there are predicted to be more countries doing subst and fewer countries 
doing intens MPFs, and also more countries doing IT and fewer doing D, than the actual 
numbers, and these larger divergences deserve further investigation. The former group – 
countries predicted to do subst but doing intens – includes, over all or most of 2000-10, Chile, 
Israel, Korea, Peru and Poland, which had all moved to full IT (intens), but it also includes 
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Cyprus, Jordan and Latvia (full ERT – intens) and Malaysia (WSD – intens). The latter group 
– countries predicted to do IT but doing D – includes Argentina (after its exit from the currency 
board), Croatia (discussed above), Iceland (2006-10 when its announced inflation targets were 
repeatedly and widely missed, so it is classified as (loosely structured) discretion) and Japan 
(in the years immediately before it adopted ITs). Thus the identification of the countries 
involved in these errors suggests that the errors are heterogeneous, with no clear pattern, which 
in turn indicates that our model is not obviously missing out some important determinant. In 
addition, the countries identified here do not in either case coincide well with any of the groups 
picked out in the narrative of section 2, and the predicted and actual choices tend to converge 
after 2010.  
 
 
Figure 3 Predicted versus actual, by degree of control 
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Figure 4 Predicted versus actual, by target variable 
 
We now examine in more detail how well our model can explain countries’ choices of MPFs 
and where the predictions are in error. With the multinomial logit model, we can predict the 
probability of a country doing a certain MPF. If a country has the highest predicted probability 
for doing some particular MPF, we call this MPF the predicted choice of MPF. For example, 
in the year 2000, the UK has a probability of 0.501 to do intens MPF, 0.499 to do subst MPF 
and close to 0 to do inter MPF. Hence the predicted choice of MPF of the UK in 2000 is intens 
MPF. In 2000, the probability of Turkey to do intens, subst and inter MPF is 0.11, 0.89 and 0 
correspondingly, so the predicted choice of Turkey is subst MPF. If a country's predicted and 
actual choice of MPF is the same, then the prediction is correct. We calculate the proportion of 
correct predictions of MPF choice year by year for the two main regressions.  Figure 5 shows 
the percentage of accurate predictions over the years and the average. Overall the model 
performs well with an average accuracy of 75%, and the accuracy of predictions is quite smooth 
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over the years. However, the predictions for MPF aggregated by target variable are notably 
poorer in the early 2000s (but better in the late 1980s and the mid-2000s) .  
 
Figure 5 Prediction accuracy by year  
 
Figure 6 shows the proportion of correct predictions by country. For some countries, the model 
can predict their degrees of monetary control but not the target variables, and for others  the 
opposite. Most cases of poor predictions are for emerging economies, and the countries with 
the poorest predictions are Croatia, Latvia, Malaysia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and 
Switzerland.  
 
Croatia does D throughout (from 1992). In the early 2000s, as a small economy with low 
financial market depth and high anchor network effects, Croatia is predicted to do ERT, while 
in the later period, because of improved political institutions after 2000 and higher trade 
openness, it is predicted to do IT. Malaysia did D and ERT in the 1990s and 2000s, but it is 
predicted to do ERT and IT for the period because it is a small economy with high anchor 
network effects, high trade openness and (from 2008) improved political institutions. Slovenia 
did mixed targeting in the 2000s but is predicted to do ERT. Slovenia fits the characteristics of 
both Mixed and ERTs, but Mixed MPFs are more often pursued by advanced economies. 
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Latvia during the 2000s did intens, although as a very small economy, with very high historical 
peak inflation, it is predicted to do subst MPFs.  In contrast to Latvia, Slovakia did subst but is 
predicted to do intens MPFs because it is a small economy with a low level of financial market 
depth. Switzerland did subst but is predicted to do intens MPFs since it is a very small economy 
with great financial market depth and considerable trade concentration.  
 
Our model accurately predicts 75% of countries' choices, that is, it can explain most of those 
choices, but that leaves a significant margin unexplained, which is likely to reflect country-
specific factors not taken into account. For example, in Croatia, the lagged effects of conflict 
and the lack of political and social consensus may explain the unwillingness to commit to 
precise targets, while Malaysia is widely recognised to have taken a deliberately different 
direction from other countries in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Slovakia and 
Slovenia, on the other hand, were trying to qualify for entry into EMU under the (multiple) 
Maastricht Treaty criteria, and that may explain their use of multiple targets (which means 
subst rather than intens).12
 
12
 Another example of a country-specific factor is Denmark, which is predicted to do ITs between 2001 and 2014 
but does ERTs: Denmark held a referendum in 2000 on adopting the euro and, although the proposal was 
supported by the government, business, trade unions and the main political parties, it was defeated by 53.2% to 
46.8%. 
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Figure 6 Prediction accuracy by country
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6 Robustness tests 
Our model is robust to a different treatment of the Euro Area and different model specifications. 
In the previous section, we treat the Euro Area as a single unit. In robustness tests we treat the 
Euro Area member countries as individual units undertaking full exchange rate targeting. Thus, 
in the aggregations, they are doing ERTs and intens MPFs. The results are shown in table 4 
and are similar to the main results.  
 
We have also tried including terms of trade shocks (used by Levy Yeyati et al., 2010) and 
aggregate savings (used by Erdem and Özmen, 2015, in a different context) as determinants of 
MPF choices. The data availability on these two variables is limited and including them shrinks 
our sample. When we ran the regression with the smaller sample and more variables, the 
coefficients on terms of trade shocks and aggregate savings are statistically insignificant, while 
other coefficients are little changed from the main results. We have also tried to examine the 
association between economic development and MPF choices by considering the log of GDP 
per capita as an additional determinant (as in Juhn and Mauro, 2002; Calderón and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2008a and 2008b). Including this variable might raise a concern about endogeneity. 
Though we use the average value of three preceding years for determinants, both GDP per 
capita and MPF choices have strong inertia. Hence we do not include the log of GDP per capita 
in the main regressions. However, when we do include it the results show only that more 
developed economies are likely to do Mixed MPFs. The coefficients on the log of GDP per 
capita are insignificant for other MPFs, and the coefficients on other variables are similar to 
the main results in magnitudes, signs and significance levels. Regression tables from these tests 
are available upon request from the authors.  
 
7 Conclusions 
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In this paper we have investigated the determinants of countries' choices of monetary policy 
frameworks, using a new classification of frameworks which is based on de facto as well as de 
jure information, combines internal and external targets, and emphasises the context of 
monetary policy in the form of the development of financial infrastructure and the financial 
system more widely. We use a brief narrative based around those frameworks to motivate an 
econometric analysis of MPF choices. Our model uses a variable which measures the 
concentration of a country's trade with potential anchor currencies and a new index of financial 
market depth, as well as more standard determinants. The model is able to explain three 
quarters of countries' MPF choices, and there appears to be no systematic pattern in the 
prediction errors. The unexplained quarter of those choices can probably be attributed to policy 
inertia and country-specific factors or historical events not taken into account (and probably 
not able to be taken into account in this sort of analysis), and the model's overall explanatory 
performance can be regarded as more than satisfactory. Its ability to track the major trends over 
time in the choices of MPFs suggests that changes in fashion such as the rise in popularity of 
inflation targeting are of limited importance.    
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Appendix 
Table A1 Classification of countries by relative size  
Advanced 
countries  
Emerging 
economies  
Euro Area large Argentina very small 
Austria very small Brazil medium 
Belgium very small Bulgaria very small 
Finland very small Chile very small 
France medium China large 
Germany 
large to medium,  
mainly medium Croatia very small 
Greece very small Cyprus very small 
Ireland very small Czech Republic very small 
Italy medium Egypt 
very small to small, 
mainly very small 
Luxembourg very small Estonia very small 
Netherlands 
small to very small, 
mainly very small Hungary very small 
Portugal very small India large 
Spain 
medium to small,  
mainly small Indonesia medium 
Australia small Israel very small 
Canada 
medium to small,  
mainly small Jordan very small 
Denmark very small Latvia very small 
Hong Kong  very small Lithuania very small 
Iceland very small Malaysia very small 
Japan large Malta very small 
Korea (South) 
small to very small, 
mainly small Mexico 
small to medium, 
mainly medium 
New Zealand 
small to very small, 
mainly very small Morocco  very small 
Norway 
small to very small, 
mainly very small Pakistan small 
Singapore 
small to very small, 
mainly very small Peru  very small 
Sweden 
small to very small, 
mainly very small Philippines 
very small to small, 
mainly very small 
Switzerland 
small to very small, 
mainly very small Poland  very small 
United Kingdom medium Romania  very small 
United States large Russian Federation medium 
  Slovak Republic very small 
  Slovenia very small 
  South Africa very small 
  Thailand very small 
  Turkey small 
  Venezuela, RB very small 
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Note: classification by average of country's share in GDP and share in population for total 60 
countries, large =  5%, medium = < 5% but  2%, small = < 2% but  1%, all others very small. 
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Table A2: Trade openness and anchor networks 
Country Year 
Trade 
openness 
Anchor 
network 
Anchor 
currency 
Argentina 1983 14.99 0.029 USD 
 
1993 16.22 0.037 USD 
 
2003 40.64 0.112 USD 
 
2013 29.33 0.105 USD 
Australia 1983 29.22 0.078 USD 
 
1993 35.47 0.120 USD 
 
2003 40.31 0.136 USD 
 
2013 41.27 0.179 USD 
Austria 1983 62.47 0.138 DM/Euro 
 
1993 63.27 0.340 DM/Euro 
 
2003 86.39 0.539 DM/Euro 
 
2013 104.07 0.660 DM/Euro 
Belgium 1983 119.51 0.538 DM/Euro 
 
1993 108.20 0.668 DM/Euro 
 
2003 131.99 0.994 DM/Euro 
 
2013 162.22 1.183 DM/Euro 
Brazil 1983 20.43 0.098 USD 
 
1993 19.60 0.078 USD 
 
2003 28.14 0.104 USD 
 
2013 25.56 0.120 USD 
Bulgaria 1993 84.04 0.286 DM/Euro 
 
2003 79.63 0.501 DM/Euro 
 
2013 129.71 0.706 DM/Euro 
Canada 1983 46.69 0.314 USD 
 
1993 58.24 0.397 USD 
 
2003 69.84 0.488 USD 
 
2013 61.97 0.433 USD 
Chile 1983 44.82 0.130 USD 
 
1993 53.61 0.181 USD 
 
2003 66.32 0.204 USD 
 
2013 64.97 0.343 USD 
China 1983 17.92 0.041 USD 
 
1993 36.06 0.298 USD 
 
2003 51.80 0.262 USD 
 
2013 46.57 0.216 USD 
Croatia 2003 85.22 0.430 DM/Euro 
 
2013 85.13 0.415 DM/Euro 
Cyprus 1983 114.38 0.185 USD 
 
1993 95.42 0.296 DM/Euro 
 
2003 114.01 0.257 DM/Euro 
 
2013 115.47 0.295 DM/Euro 
Czech Republic 1993 79.13 0.333 DM/Euro 
 
2003 95.02 0.780 DM/Euro 
 
2013 147.98 1.157 DM/Euro 
Denmark 1983 69.63 0.216 DM/Euro 
 
1993 65.61 0.243 DM/Euro 
 
2003 80.88 0.373 DM/Euro 
 
2013 103.05 0.405 DM/Euro 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1983 61.91 0.206 DM/Euro 
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1993 55.93 0.126 DM/Euro 
 
2003 46.18 0.087 DM/Euro 
 
2013 40.37 0.166 USD 
Estonia 2003 123.28 0.888 DM/Euro 
 
2013 165.79 1.022 DM/Euro 
Finland 1983 57.37 0.169 DM/Euro 
 
1993 58.14 0.252 DM/Euro 
 
2003 68.04 0.348 DM/Euro 
 
2013 78.51 0.356 DM/Euro 
France 1983 45.14 0.121 DM/Euro 
 
1993 39.91 0.171 DM/Euro 
 
2003 50.80 0.291 DM/Euro 
 
2013 59.76 0.308 DM/Euro 
Germany 1983 43.72 0.203 GBP 
 
1993 40.64 0.167 DM/Euro 
 
2003 61.52 0.348 DM/Euro 
 
2013 84.84 0.446 DM/Euro 
Greece 1983 41.18 0.099 DM/Euro 
 
1993 37.03 0.149 DM/Euro 
 
2003 48.19 0.178 DM/Euro 
 
2013 63.52 0.206 DM/Euro 
Hong Kong SAR, China 1983 186.33 0.447 USD 
 
1993 233.97 0.851 USD 
 
2003 292.46 1.029 USD 
 
2013 442.62 1.403 USD 
Hungary 1983 0.00 0.122 DM/Euro 
 
1993 53.47 0.320 DM/Euro 
 
2003 116.43 0.745 DM/Euro 
 
2013 164.34 1.127 DM/Euro 
Iceland 1983 77.21 0.207 DM/Euro 
 
1993 62.38 0.286 DM/Euro 
 
2003 68.88 0.333 DM/Euro 
 
2013 102.41 0.395 DM/Euro 
India 1983 13.84 0.044 USD 
 
1993 19.86 0.071 USD 
 
2003 30.92 0.088 USD 
 
2013 53.84 0.264 USD 
Indonesia 1983 56.56 0.128 USD 
 
1993 50.52 0.142 USD 
 
2003 53.62 0.183 USD 
 
2013 48.64 0.210 USD 
Ireland 1983 97.62 0.367 GBP 
 
1993 116.46 0.588 DM/Euro 
 
2003 146.55 0.625 DM/Euro 
 
2013 193.29 0.546 DM/Euro 
Israel 1983 63.40 0.144 DM/Euro 
 1993 67.20 0.235 DM/Euro 
 2003 70.08 0.213 USD 
 
2013 64.72 0.205 USD 
Italy 1983 40.31 0.109 DM/Euro 
 
1993 37.88 0.158 DM/Euro 
 
2003 46.27 0.236 DM/Euro 
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2013 55.47 0.270 DM/Euro 
Japan 1983 25.06 0.126 USD 
 
1993 16.01 0.089 USD 
 
2003 21.58 0.123 USD 
 
2013 34.15 0.220 USD 
Jordan 1983 117.14 0.301 USD 
 
1993 130.49 0.350 USD 
 
2003 115.71 0.388 USD 
 
2013 114.31 0.512 USD 
Korea, Rep. 1983 58.05 0.261 USD 
 
1993 47.59 0.206 USD 
 
2003 63.39 0.313 USD 
 
2013 102.77 0.517 USD 
Latvia 2003 84.78 0.574 DM/Euro 
 
2013 124.16 0.788 DM/Euro 
Lithuania 2003 98.13 0.465 DM/Euro 
 
2013 166.87 0.830 DM/Euro 
Luxembourg 1983 170.97 0.467 DM/Euro 
 
1993 176.67 0.580 DM/Euro 
 
2003 254.10 0.838 DM/Euro 
Malaysia 1983 107.69 0.263 USD 
 
1993 157.94 0.514 USD 
 
2003 194.19 0.859 USD 
 
2013 142.72 0.736 USD 
Malta 1983 133.46 0.360 DM/Euro 
 
1993 178.91 0.948 DM/Euro 
 
2003 214.57 0.692 DM/Euro 
 
2013 307.85 0.703 DM/Euro 
Mexico 1983 28.42 0.167 USD 
 
1993 27.83 0.200 USD 
 
2003 50.21 0.391 USD 
 
2013 63.76 0.538 USD 
Morocco 1983 52.61 0.163 DM/Euro 
 
1993 49.67 0.206 DM/Euro 
 
2003 58.33 0.312 DM/Euro 
 
2013 80.02 0.357 DM/Euro 
Netherlands 1983 105.36 0.300 DM/Euro 
 
1993 99.45 0.432 DM/Euro 
 
2003 112.65 0.604 DM/Euro 
 
2013 153.32 0.900 DM/Euro 
New Zealand 1983 57.58 0.127 USD 
 
1993 57.63 0.154 USD 
 
2003 57.91 0.134 USD 
 
2013 56.02 0.213 USD 
Norway 1983 74.75 0.205 DM/Euro 
 
1993 68.05 0.264 DM/Euro 
 
2003 66.58 0.371 DM/Euro 
 
2013 67.49 0.328 DM/Euro 
Pakistan 1983 34.90 0.127 USD 
 
1993 38.75 0.134 USD 
 
2003 32.84 0.156 USD 
 
2013 33.33 0.232 USD 
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Peru 1983 43.24 0.144 USD 
 
1993 28.50 0.119 USD 
 
2003 37.62 0.128 USD 
 
2013 49.78 0.281 USD 
Philippines 1983 49.42 0.195 USD 
 
1993 71.17 0.280 USD 
 
2003 101.85 0.521 USD 
 
2013 60.25 0.298 USD 
Poland 1993 40.52 0.232 DM/Euro 
 
2003 69.44 0.404 DM/Euro 
 
2013 90.69 0.562 DM/Euro 
Portugal 1983 58.92 0.171 DM/Euro 
 
1993 54.17 0.250 DM/Euro 
 
2003 60.44 0.400 DM/Euro 
 
2013 78.03 0.446 DM/Euro 
Romania 1993 51.00 0.193 DM/Euro 
 
2003 76.51 0.484 DM/Euro 
 
2013 80.27 0.520 DM/Euro 
Russian Federation 1993 68.70 0.074 DM/Euro 
 
2003 59.13 0.223 DM/Euro 
 
2013 46.19 0.179 DM/Euro 
Singapore 1983 333.31 1.326 USD 
 
1993 313.20 1.471 USD 
 
2003 382.84 1.456 USD 
 
2013 365.69 1.265 USD 
Slovak Republic 1993 114.80 0.519 DM/Euro 
 
2003 126.28 0.750 DM/Euro 
 
2013 183.41 1.296 DM/Euro 
Slovenia 2003 102.11 0.729 DM/Euro 
 
2013 143.47 1.040 DM/Euro 
South Africa 1983 44.30 0.059 DM/Euro 
 
1993 39.12 0.101 DM/Euro 
 
2003 51.40 0.189 DM/Euro 
 
2013 64.24 0.391 USD 
Spain 1983 39.82 0.088 USD 
 
1993 36.99 0.166 DM/Euro 
 
2003 53.11 0.290 DM/Euro 
 
2013 61.18 0.302 DM/Euro 
Sweden 1983 65.50 0.214 DM/Euro 
 
1993 59.24 0.276 DM/Euro 
 
2003 76.15 0.359 DM/Euro 
 
2013 83.09 0.377 DM/Euro 
Switzerland 1983 88.41 0.195 DM/Euro 
 
1993 78.48 0.328 DM/Euro 
 
2003 89.53 0.419 DM/Euro 
 
2013 131.80 0.393 DM/Euro 
Thailand 1983 47.38 0.147 USD 
 
1993 77.75 0.223 USD 
 
2003 116.69 0.474 USD 
 
2013 133.41 0.631 USD 
Turkey 1983 29.03 0.110 USD 
 
1993 33.02 0.120 DM/Euro 
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2003 45.60 0.220 DM/Euro 
 
2013 50.35 0.215 DM/Euro 
United Kingdom 1983 49.51 0.166 DM/Euro 
 
1993 48.48 0.161 DM/Euro 
 
2003 49.47 0.199 DM/Euro 
 
2013 61.35 0.226 DM/Euro 
United States 1983 16.65 0.046 USD 
 
1993 19.99 0.074 USD 
 
2003 22.45 0.061 USD 
 
2013 30.23 0.149 USD 
Venezuela, RB 1983 30.72 0.134 USD 
 
1993 54.14 0.320 USD 
 
2003 50.58 0.295 USD 
 
2013 54.28 0.220 USD 
Euro Area 2003 28.96 0.131 DM/Euro 
 2013 37.08 0.187 DM/Euro 
 
Notes: trade openness = (exports + imports)/GDP, %;  
anchor network = highest (exports + imports)/GDP for any currency bloc; 
currency bloc = bloc with highest (exports + imports)/GDP for that country. 
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Table A3 Robustness test: treatment of Euro Area countries as separate countries 
  D Mixed IT 
 
substantial intensive 
very small economy -3.161*** -4.364*** -3.667*** 
 
-1.633** -1.696** 
 
(0.643) (0.711) (0.664) 
 
(0.607) (0.651) 
medium economy -1.269 0.639 -1.059 
 
0.147 -1.791* 
 
(0.747) (0.794) (0.773) 
 
(0.749) (0.822) 
large economy 16.37 14.19 13.63 
 
-0.144 -4.455*** 
 
(1214.3) (1214.3) (1214.3) 
 
(0.915) (1.013) 
trade openness 0.512 3.946*** 2.637*** 
 
-0.156 -0.942 
 
(0.301) (0.482) (0.316) 
 
(0.849) (0.855) 
anchor network / GDP -8.154*** -5.110*** -13.50*** 
 
-2.878 -2.040 
 
(1.149) (1.158) (1.144) 
 
(2.679) (2.712) 
past inflation 10% 0.624 -0.213 -1.116*** 
 
3.118*** 2.805*** 
 
(0.438) (0.358) (0.335) 
 
(0.754) (0.766) 
past inflation 20% 1.111*** 0.731* 1.714*** 
 
-0.110 -2.774*** 
 
(0.236) (0.357) (0.318) 
 
(0.444) (0.495) 
financial markets depth 4.844*** 1.510 5.523*** 
 
19.37*** 17.93*** 
 
(0.681) (0.884) (0.693) 
 
(3.132) (3.164) 
capital account openness -0.422*** -0.462*** 0.106 
 
1.391*** 1.654*** 
 
(0.0791) (0.130) (0.0967) 
 
(0.245) (0.252) 
central bank independence 0.688 6.414*** -1.365* 
 
-1.535 -0.194 
 
(0.621) (0.915) (0.682) 
 
(1.258) (1.332) 
polity -0.00910 0.920*** 0.250*** 
 
-0.101*** 0.0139 
 
(0.0186) (0.130) (0.0393) 
 
(0.0296) (0.0357) 
emerging 1.636*** -3.449*** 0.912** 
 
-1.730*** -3.313*** 
 
(0.284) (0.515) (0.354) 
 
(0.490) (0.539) 
fuel_exporter 0.982*** -1.996*** -0.708* 
 
-1.236** -2.137*** 
  (0.240) (0.544) (0.333) 
 
(0.382) (0.448) 
N 
  
1649 
  
1678 
pseudo R2 
  
0.538 
  
0.484 
Log likelihood     -1041.6 
 
  -760.0 
The default category is Intermediate and ERT respectively. *, ** and *** represents significance level at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. Standard errors in the brackets. Euro Area member countries are treated separately.  
 
